

# Mr. Shakespeare, Meet Mr. Tucker, Part II

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To investigate the use of tensor decomposition in static malware analysis - on a large scale


- Malware analysis is often done "in the small", that is, on one specimen at a time [1]
- We need to do malware analysis "in the large"
- Can we use tensor decomposition to gain insight into large collections of malware?

We selected a specific malware family, the well-known Zeus Trojans [2], as test subjects.

The tensor  $X$  is constructed so that: for each Zeus file  $i$ , entry  $x_{i,j,k}$  is how many times 4-gram  $j$  occurs in decile  $k$  of the file. That is,

- $1 \leq i \leq 8020$ , the number of Zeus specimens available to us
- $1 \leq j \leq 2^{32}$ , the upper bound on the number of distinct 4-grams. The actual number of distinct 4-grams of course varies from file to file.
- $1 \leq k \leq 10$ , since we chose to represent the approximate location in each specimen by dividing each specimen into ten parts of equal length.

# Tucker Decomposition from Kolda [3]




**Fig. 4.1** *Tucker decomposition of a three-way array.*

Before trying the Zeus data, we wanted to try a smaller corpus - the Shakespearean plays. [4]

Using Python packages `sklearn` (to parse the text data) and `tensorD`[5] and `tensorflow` (to do the tensor calculations), in a Jupyter Notebook, we built the tensor  $X$  as described earlier, and ran both HOSVD and HOOI versions of Tucker.

# Plot of First Two Factors from Tucker Decomposition



- In the Shakespearean tensor  $X$ , entry  $x_{i,j,k}$  is the number of times word  $j$  occurs in Act  $k$  of play  $i$ . The value of  $i$  ranges from 1 to 37,  $j$  ranges from 1 to about 30,000, and  $k$  ranges from 1 to 5. The tensor is quite sparse.
- Plotting the first two factors produced by HOOI, HOSVD gave similar results
- We are pleased with the (unsupervised!) clustering of the history plays at the bottom of the plot.






- Malware binaries will have *many* more terms than Shakespeare does, so we must be selective.
- Only some of the Zeus binaries are unpacked, so focus on those first.



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# References

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