

Modeling Trust in Distributed Systems

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Presented at the Second Workshop on [Norms and Institutions in MAS, Autonomous Agents](#), Montreal, May 29, 2001



Outline

- ✓ Problems
- ✓ What is Distributed Trust
- ✓ Background
- ✓ Limitations
- ✓ Overview of our system
- ✓ Design
- ✓ Ontology
- ✓ How it works
- ✓ Processing
- ✓ Ongoing Work
- ✓ Summary



Problem

There are 2 scenarios that we are trying to address

1. Supply Chain Management System
 - ✓ Focus of the paper
2. Dynamic Wireless Environment
 - ✓ Ongoing work



Supply Chain Management

- ✓ Inter company information access
- ✓ Sharing/accessing information, and performing actions across (or within) organizations
- ✓ have to observe organizational policies for security and authorization.



Supply Chain Management

- ✓ We need to:
 - grant authorization and rights
 - delegate authorization and rights
 - request certificates proving authorizations
 - request actions, attaching certificates as necessary
- ✓ Implemented a system for CIIMPLEX EECOMS project



CIIMPLEX EECOMS

CIIMPLEX: Consortium for Integrated Intelligent Manufacturing Planning and Execution

EECOMS : Extended Enterprise Coalition for Integrated Collaborative Manufacturing Systems

Funder: National Institute of Standards and Technology / Advanced Technology Program Technologies for the Integration of Manufacturing Applications (TIMA)

Goal: Plug and Play framework of business objectives and integration-enabling tools allowing a suite of solutions that can be implemented "out-of-the-box" at small and midsized manufacturing

and process sites including MES, ERP, Finite Scheduling, and Capacity Analysis/Decision Support

Objectives: interoperability, configurability, adaptability, extensibility, plug and play.

Focus: supply chain management



CIIMPLEX Participants

- | | |
|---|-------------------------|
| ✓ IBM Corp | ✓ QAD Inc |
| ✓ University of Maryland Baltimore County | ✓ GSE Systems |
| ✓ University of Florida | ✓ Lucent Technologies |
| ✓ University of North Carolina at Charlotte | ✓ Ingersoll-Rand Co. |
| ✓ Berclain USA Ltd. | - Demand Solutions |
| ✓ Boeing | - DLoG Remex Inc. |
| | ✓ Intercim |
| | ✓ EnvisionIt Software |
| | ✓ The Haley Corporation |




CIIMPLEX



Dynamic Wireless Environments

- ✓ Unknown entities
- ✓ Wireless devices are resource poor
- ✓ Authenticate other wireless devices
- ✓ Need to communicate and sometimes use other devices



Dynamic Wireless Environments

- ✓ We need to
 - specify 'public' policies
 - Manage authorization and delegation
 - Implementation should be 'light', yet effective



Distributed Trust

- ✓ **Issues**
 - No central authority
 - logging in is not possible
 - Access control for entities never encountered before
- ✓ We use Distributed Trust to solve the above issues
- ✓ **Distributed Trust**
 - trust = policies + credentials + determining if credentials fulfill policies + delegating trust to third parties



Background

- ✓ PGP
 - Secure emails
 - web of trust
- ✓ SPKI
 - used for access control
 - A PKC consists of key, name, authorization
 - includes notion of delegation + permission to delegate further
 - authorization certificates
 - Depth of delegation is boolean or integer



Background (cont.)

- ✓ Role based Access Control
- ✓ Trust Establishment
 - based on role based Access Control
 - Policy Language is defined in XML
 - Certificate Collector collects missing certificates
 - supports negative certificates
- ✓ PolicyMaker
 - binds public keys to predicates
 - no mapping between keys and personal id
 - simple language to express trust info
 - Given policy, answers queries about trust



Background (cont.)

- ✓ Delegation Logic
 - Language for specifying trust information
 - ability to manage non-monotonic reasoning
 - expresses delegation depth explicitly



Limitations

- ✓ PGP and X.509 certificates
 - provide authorization
 - no delegation
- ✓ SPKI
 - provides authorization
 - limited delegation
 - no constraints on delegations
- ✓ Role based
 - Difficult in inter company communication as roles are different across domains



Limitations

- ✓ Trust Establishment
 - specifies certificate types that makes interoperability with other TE systems difficult
 - used for mapping between entities and roles
 - limited support for delegation
- ✓ PolicyMaker
 - Policy is complex, fully programmable
 - Hard to understand for non programmers



Overview of our System

- ✓ provides authorization
- ✓ representation for credentials and trust relationships
- ✓ flexibility in describing policies
- ✓ constraints on execution
- ✓ constraints on further delegation



Overview of our System

- ✓ Security and authorization policy represented as rules and constraints
- ✓ Principals make signed statements
- ✓ Principals can be humans (via a suitable interface) or software agents acting on the behalf of humans
- ✓ Agents reason about the policy and statements to derive (prove) authorizations




Design

Supply Chain Management System

- ✓ Companies have security policies
- ✓ Policy enforced by a number of 'security officers'
- ✓ Each agent in the system has an ID certificate, X.509
- ✓ All communication via signed messages
- ✓ Trust info encoded in Prolog



Design



Ontology

- ✓ Agents
 - Entities in the system
 - Associated with roles
- ✓ Actions
 - application specific action
- ✓ Propositions
 - Permissions
 - Actions that an agent can perform
 - permission(Agent,Action,Constraint)



Ontology

- Delegations
Abilities that are deferred
delegate(Issue,Start,End,From,To,Permission,
Constraint on redelegation, Flag)
Delegation is an ability
- ✓ requests
request(From,To,Action)
requestCert(From,To,Action)




Policy


- ✓ Security Policy
 - Authorization policies
 - Specifies rules for checking credentials
 - Delegation policies
 - Rules for deferring of permissions
 - Basic Permissions
 - Role based access rights for entities
 - Access rights for an agent
 - Certain basic rights




How it works : Initial delegation




How it works : Request



How it works : Delegation



How it works : Request



Processing

- ✓ Prolog is used to specify policies, delegations and queries
- ✓ An action is allowed if
 - the agent has the ability to perform the action or
 - has been delegated the ability by someone, who has the ability to delegate



Processing

- ✓ An agent has the right to delegate if
 - it is an ability
 - or someone had delegated to it the right and the delegator had the *right to delegate*



Ongoing Work

- ✓ Use a semantic language based on XML (RDF/DAML) for representation of trust information
- ✓ Use XML Signatures
- ✓ Trust in dynamic wireless environment
- ✓ Specifying ontology for permissions, obligations, entitlements, prohibitions in RDF/DAML



Ongoing Work

- ✓ Reputation mechanism
- ✓ Using smart cards for authentication
- ✓ Delegating of obligations, entitlements, prohibitions
- ✓ Short lived Propositions
 - reduces processing time
 - easy handling of revocations



Summary

- ✓ We have developed an infrastructure for distributed trust
- ✓ Designed a representation for trust info, credentials and policies
- ✓ Showed its feasibility through implementation
- ✓ Discussed some of our future research directions



Questions

