

Bayesian Reasoning

Chapter 13



[Thomas Bayes, 1701-1761](#)

1

Today's topics

- Review probability theory
- Bayesian inference
 - From the joint distribution
 - Using independence/factoring
 - From sources of evidence

2

Sources of Uncertainty

- Uncertain **inputs** -- missing and/or noisy data
- Uncertain **knowledge**
 - Multiple causes lead to multiple effects
 - Incomplete enumeration of conditions or effects
 - Incomplete knowledge of causality in the domain
 - Probabilistic/stochastic effects
- Uncertain **outputs**
 - Abduction and induction are inherently uncertain
 - Default reasoning, even deductive, is uncertain
 - Incomplete deductive inference may be uncertain
- ▶ Probabilistic reasoning only gives probabilistic results (summarizes uncertainty from various sources)

3

Decision making with uncertainty

Rational behavior:


- For each possible action, identify the possible outcomes
- Compute the **probability** of each outcome
- Compute the **utility** of each outcome
- Compute the probability-weighted (**expected utility**) over possible outcomes for each action
- Select action with the highest expected utility (principle of **Maximum Expected Utility**)

4

Why probabilities anyway?

Kolmogorov showed that three simple axioms lead to the rules of probability theory

1. All probabilities are between 0 and 1:
 $0 \leq P(a) \leq 1$
2. Valid propositions (tautologies) have probability 1, and unsatisfiable propositions have probability 0:
 $P(\text{true}) = 1$; $P(\text{false}) = 0$
3. The probability of a disjunction is given by:
 $P(a \vee b) = P(a) + P(b) - P(a \wedge b)$



5

Probability theory 101

- **Random variables**
 - Domain
 - **Atomic event:** complete specification of state
 - **Prior probability:** degree of belief without any other evidence
 - **Joint probability:** matrix of combined probabilities of a set of variables
- Alarm, Burglary, Earthquake
 - Boolean (like these), discrete, continuous
 - $\text{Alarm} = \text{T} \wedge \text{Burglary} = \text{T} \wedge \text{Earthquake} = \text{F}$
 $\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary} \wedge \neg \text{earthquake}$
 - $P(\text{Burglary}) = 0.1$
 $P(\text{Alarm}) = 0.1$
 $P(\text{earthquake}) = 0.000003$
 - $P(\text{Alarm, Burglary}) =$

	alarm	¬alarm
burglary	.09	.01
¬burglary	.1	.8

6

Probability theory 101

	alarm	¬alarm
burglary	.09	.01
¬burglary	.1	.8

- **Conditional probability:** prob. of effect given causes
 - **Computing conditional probs:**
 - $P(a | b) = P(a \wedge b) / P(b)$
 - $P(b)$: **normalizing** constant
 - **Product rule:**
 - $P(a \wedge b) = P(a | b) * P(b)$
 - **Marginalizing:**
 - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B, a)$
 - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B | a) P(a)$ (**conditioning**)
- $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .47$
 $P(\text{alarm} | \text{burglary}) = .9$
 - $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) / P(\text{alarm}) = .09 / .19 = .47$
 - $P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) = P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) * P(\text{alarm}) = .47 * .19 = .09$
 - $P(\text{alarm}) = P(\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary}) + P(\text{alarm} \wedge \neg \text{burglary}) = .09 + .1 = .19$

7

Example: Inference from the joint

	alarm		¬alarm	
	earthquake	¬earthquake	earthquake	¬earthquake
burglary	.01	.08	.001	.009
¬burglary	.01	.09	.01	.79

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) &= \alpha P(\text{burglary, alarm}) \\
 &= \alpha [P(\text{burglary, alarm, earthquake}) + P(\text{burglary, alarm, } \neg \text{earthquake})] \\
 &= \alpha [(.01, .01) + (.08, .09)] \\
 &= \alpha [(.09, .1)]
 \end{aligned}$$

Since $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) + P(\neg \text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = 1$, $\alpha = 1 / (.09 + .1) = 5.26$ (i.e., $P(\text{alarm}) = 1 / \alpha = .19$ – **quizlet**: how can you verify this?)

$$P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .09 * 5.26 = .474$$

$$P(\neg \text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .1 * 5.26 = .526$$

8

Exercise: Inference from the joint



p(smart $\wedge$ study $\wedge$ prep)	smart		$\neg$ smart	
	study	$\neg$ study	study	$\neg$ study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
$\neg$ prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

- Queries:
 - What is the prior probability of *smart*?
 - What is the prior probability of *study*?
 - What is the conditional probability of *prepared*, given *study* and *smart*?
- Save these answers for next time! ☺

9

Independence



- When sets of variables don't affect each others' probabilities, we call them **independent**, and can easily compute their joint and conditional probability:
 $\text{Independent}(A, B) \rightarrow P(A \wedge B) = P(A) * P(B), P(A | B) = P(A)$
- {moonPhase, lightLevel} *might* be independent of {burglary, alarm, earthquake}
 - Maybe not: crooks may be more likely to burglarize houses during a new moon (and hence little light)
 - But if we know the light level, the moon phase doesn't affect whether we are burglarized
 - If burglarized, light level doesn't affect if alarm goes off
- Need a more complex notion of independence and methods for reasoning about the relationships

10

Exercise: Independence



p(smart $\wedge$ study $\wedge$ prep)	smart		$\neg$ smart	
	study	$\neg$ study	study	$\neg$ study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
$\neg$ prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

- Queries:
- Is *smart* independent of *study*?
 - Is *prepared* independent of *study*?

11

Conditional independence

- Absolute independence:
 - A and B are **independent** if $P(A \wedge B) = P(A) * P(B)$; equivalently, $P(A) = P(A | B)$ and $P(B) = P(B | A)$
- A and B are **conditionally independent** given C if
 - $P(A \wedge B | C) = P(A | C) * P(B | C)$
- This lets us decompose the joint distribution:
 - $P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A | C) * P(B | C) * P(C)$
- Moon-Phase and Burglary are **conditionally independent given** Light-Level
- Conditional independence is weaker than absolute independence, but still useful in decomposing the full joint probability distribution

12

Exercise: Conditional independence




p(smart $\wedge$ study $\wedge$ prep)	smart		$\neg$ smart	
	study	$\neg$ study	study	$\neg$ study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
$\neg$ prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

Queries:

- Is *smart* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *study*?
- Is *study* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *smart*?

13

Bayes' rule



- Derived from the product rule:
 - $P(C | E) = P(E | C) * P(C) / P(E)$
- Often useful for diagnosis:
 - If E are (observed) effects and C are (hidden) causes,
 - We may have a model for how causes lead to effects ($P(E | C)$)
 - We may also have prior beliefs (based on experience) about the frequency of occurrence of effects ($P(C)$)
 - Which allows us to reason abductively from effects to causes ($P(C | E)$)

14


Ex: meningitis and stiff neck

- Meningitis (M) can cause a a stiff neck (S), though here are many other causes for S, too
- We'd like to use S as a diagnostic symptom and estimate $p(M|S)$
- Studies can easily estimate $p(M)$, $p(S)$ and $p(S|M)$
 $p(M)=0.7$, $p(S)=0.01$, $p(M)=0.00002$
- Applying Bayes' Rule:
 $p(M|S) = p(S|M) * p(M) / p(S) = 0.0014$
- We can also do this w/o $p(S)$ if we know $p(S|\sim M)$
 $\alpha < p(S|M)*P(m), p(S|\sim M)*p(\sim M) >$

15

Bayesian inference

- In the setting of diagnostic/evidential reasoning



- Know prior probability of hypothesis $P(H_i)$
- conditional probability $P(E_j | H_i)$
- Want to compute the *posterior probability*
- Bayes' s theorem (formula 1):

$$P(H_i | E_j) = P(H_i) * P(E_j | H_i) / P(E_j)$$

16

Simple Bayesian diagnostic reasoning

- Also known as: [Naive Bayes classifier](#)
- Knowledge base:
 - Evidence / manifestations: $E_1, \dots, E_m$
 - Hypotheses / disorders: $H_1, \dots, H_n$
 - Note: E_j and H_i are **binary**; hypotheses are **mutually exclusive** (non-overlapping) and **exhaustive** (cover all possible cases)
 - Conditional probabilities: $P(E_j | H_i)$, $i = 1, \dots, n$; $j = 1, \dots, m$
- Cases (evidence for a particular instance): $E_1, \dots, E_l$
- Goal: Find the hypothesis H_i with the highest posterior
 - $\text{Max}_i P(H_i | E_1, \dots, E_l)$

17

Simple Bayesian diagnostic reasoning

- Bayes' rule says that

$$P(H_i | E_1 \dots E_m) = P(E_1 \dots E_m | H_i) P(H_i) / P(E_1 \dots E_m)$$
- Assume each evidence E_i is conditionally independent of the others, *given* a hypothesis H_i , then:

$$P(E_1 \dots E_m | H_i) = \prod_{j=1}^m P(E_j | H_i)$$
- If we only care about relative probabilities for the H_i , then we have:

$$P(H_i | E_1 \dots E_m) = \alpha P(H_i) \prod_{j=1}^m P(E_j | H_i)$$

18

Limitations

- Cannot easily handle multi-fault situations, nor cases where intermediate (hidden) causes exist:
 - Disease D causes syndrome S, which causes correlated manifestations M_1 and M_2
- Consider a composite hypothesis $H_1 \wedge H_2$, where H_1 and H_2 are independent. What's the relative posterior?

$$\begin{aligned} P(H_1 \wedge H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_l) &= \alpha P(E_1, \dots, E_l | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1 \wedge H_2) \\ &= \alpha P(E_1, \dots, E_l | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1) P(H_2) \\ &= \alpha \prod_{j=1}^l P(E_j | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1) P(H_2) \end{aligned}$$
- How do we compute $P(E_j | H_1 \wedge H_2)$?

19

Limitations

- Assume H_1 and H_2 are independent, given $E_1, \dots, E_l$?
 - $P(H_1 \wedge H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_l) = P(H_1 | E_1, \dots, E_l) P(H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_l)$
- This is a very unreasonable assumption
 - Earthquake and Burglar are independent, but *not* given Alarm:
 - $P(\text{burglar} | \text{alarm}, \text{earthquake}) \ll P(\text{burglar} | \text{alarm})$
- Another limitation is that simple application of Bayes' rule doesn't allow us to handle causal chaining:
 - A: this year's weather; B: cotton production; C: next year's cotton price
 - A influences C indirectly: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$
 - $P(C | B, A) = P(C | B)$
- Need a richer representation to model interacting hypotheses, conditional independence, and causal chaining
- Next: conditional independence and Bayesian networks!

20

Summary

- Probability is a rigorous formalism for uncertain knowledge
- **Joint probability distribution** specifies probability of every **atomic event**
- Can answer queries by summing over atomic events
- But we must find a way to reduce the joint size for non-trivial domains
- **Bayes' rule** lets unknown probabilities be computed from known conditional probabilities, usually in the causal direction
- **Independence** and **conditional independence** provide the tools

21

Postscript: Frequentists vs. Bayesians

- **Frequentist inference** draws conclusions from sample data based on the frequency or proportion of the data
- **Bayesian inference** uses Bayes' rule to update probability estimates for a hypothesis as additional evidence is learned
- The differences are often subtle, but can be consequential

22

Frequentists vs. Bayesians

<http://xkcd.com/1132/>

