

First-Order Logic: Review

First-order logic

- First-order logic (FOL) models the world in terms of
 - **Objects**, which are things with individual identities
 - **Properties** of objects that distinguish them from others
 - **Relations** that hold among sets of objects
 - **Functions**, which are a subset of relations where there is only one “value” for any given “input”
- Examples:
 - Objects: Students, lectures, companies, cars ...
 - Relations: Brother-of, bigger-than, outside, part-of, has-color, occurs-after, owns, visits, precedes, ...
 - Properties: blue, oval, even, large, ...
 - Functions: father-of, best-friend, second-half, more-than ...

User provides

- **Constant symbols** representing individuals in the world
 - Mary, 3, green
- **Function symbols**, map individuals to individuals
 - father_of(Mary) = John
 - color_of(Sky) = Blue
- **Predicate symbols**, map individuals to truth values
 - greater(5,3)
 - green(Grass)
 - color(Grass, Green)

FOL Provides

- **Variable symbols**

- E.g., x , y , foo

- **Connectives**

- Same as in propositional logic: not (\neg), and (\wedge), or (\vee), implies (\rightarrow), iff (\leftrightarrow)

- **Quantifiers**

- Universal $\forall x$ or (Ax)

- Existential $\exists x$ or (Ex)

Sentences: built from terms and atoms

- A **term** (denoting a real-world individual) is a constant symbol, variable symbol, or n-place function of n terms.
- Examples of terms:
 - Constants: john, umbc
 - Variables: x, y, z
 - Functions: mother_of(john), phone(mother(x))
- Ground terms have no variables in them
 - A term with no variables is a **ground term**, i.e., john, father_of(father_of(john))

Sentences: built from terms and atoms

- An **atomic sentence** (which has value true or false) is an n-place predicate of n terms, e.g.:
 - green(Kermit))
 - between(Philadelphia, Baltimore, DC)
 - loves(X, mother(X))
- A **complex sentence** is formed from atomic sentences connected by the logical connectives:
 - $\neg P$, $P \vee Q$, $P \wedge Q$, $P \rightarrow Q$, $P \leftrightarrow Q$ where P and Q are sentences

Sentences: built from terms and atoms

- A **quantified sentence** adds quantifiers \forall and \exists
 - $\forall x \text{ loves}(x, \text{mother}(x))$
 - $\exists x \text{ number}(x) \wedge \text{greater}(x, 100), \text{prime}(x)$
- A **well-formed formula (wff)** is a sentence containing no “free” variables. That is, all variables are “bound” by either a universal or existential quantifiers.
 - $(\forall x)P(x,y)$ has x bound as a universally quantified variable, but y is free

A BNF for FOL

```
S := <Sentence> ;
<Sentence> := <AtomicSentence> |
             <Sentence> <Connective> <Sentence> |
             <Quantifier> <Variable>, ... <Sentence> |
             "NOT" <Sentence> |
             "(" <Sentence> ")";
<AtomicSentence> := <Predicate> "(" <Term>, ... ")" |
                  <Term> "=" <Term>;
<Term> := <Function> "(" <Term>, ... ")" |
         <Constant> |
         <Variable>;
<Connective> := "AND" | "OR" | "IMPLIES" | "EQUIVALENT";
<Quantifier> := "EXISTS" | "FORALL" ;
<Constant> := "A" | "X1" | "John" | ... ;
<Variable> := "a" | "x" | "s" | ... ;
<Predicate> := "Before" | "HasColor" | "Raining" | ... ;
<Function> := "Mother" | "LeftLegOf" | ... ;
```

Quantifiers

- **Universal quantification**

- $(\forall x)P(x)$ means P holds for **all** values of x in domain associated with variable
- E.g., $(\forall x) \text{dolphin}(x) \rightarrow \text{mammal}(x)$

- **Existential quantification**

- $(\exists x)P(x)$ means P holds for **some** value of x in domain associated with variable
- E.g., $(\exists x) \text{mammal}(x) \wedge \text{lays_eggs}(x)$
- Permits one to make a statement about some object without naming it

Quantifiers

- Universal quantifiers often used with *implies* to form *rules*:
 $(\forall x) \text{ student}(x) \rightarrow \text{smart}(x)$ means “All students are smart”
- Universal quantification is *rarely* used to make blanket statements about every individual in the world:
 $(\forall x) \text{ student}(x) \wedge \text{smart}(x)$ means “Everyone in the world is a student and is smart”
- Existential quantifiers are usually used with “and” to specify a list of properties about an individual:
 $(\exists x) \text{ student}(x) \wedge \text{smart}(x)$ means “There is a student who is smart”
- Common mistake: represent this EN sentence in FOL as:
 $(\exists x) \text{ student}(x) \rightarrow \text{smart}(x)$
 - What does this sentence mean?

Quantifier Scope

- FOL sentences have structure, like programs
- In particular, the variables in a sentence have a scope
- For example, suppose we want to say
 - “everyone who is alive loves someone”
 - $(\forall x) \text{ alive}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y) \text{ loves}(x,y)$
- Here's how we scope the variables

$$(\forall x) \text{ alive}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y) \text{ loves}(x,y)$$


 Scope of x
 Scope of y

Quantifier Scope

- **Switching order of universal quantifiers *does not* change the meaning**
 - $(\forall x)(\forall y)P(x,y) \leftrightarrow (\forall y)(\forall x) P(x,y)$
 - “Dogs hate cats” (i.e., “all dogs hate all cats”)
- **You can switch order of existential quantifiers**
 - $(\exists x)(\exists y)P(x,y) \leftrightarrow (\exists y)(\exists x) P(x,y)$
 - “A cat killed a dog”
- **Switching order of universals and existentials *does* change meaning:**
 - Everyone likes someone: $(\forall x)(\exists y) \text{ likes}(x,y)$
 - Someone is liked by everyone: $(\exists y)(\forall x) \text{ likes}(x,y)$

Connections between All and Exists

- We can relate sentences involving \forall and \exists using extensions to **De Morgan's laws**:
 1. $(\forall x) \neg P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\exists x) P(x)$
 2. $\neg(\forall x) P \leftrightarrow (\exists x) \neg P(x)$
 3. $(\forall x) P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg (\exists x) \neg P(x)$
 4. $(\exists x) P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\forall x) \neg P(x)$
- Examples
 1. All dogs don't like cats \leftrightarrow No dogs like cats
 2. Not all dogs dance \leftrightarrow There is a dog that doesn't dance
 3. All dogs sleep \leftrightarrow There is no dog that doesn't sleep
 4. There is a dog that talks \leftrightarrow Not all dogs can't talk

Quantified inference rules

- Universal instantiation
 - $\forall x P(x) \therefore P(A)$ # where A is some constant
- Universal generalization
 - $P(A) \wedge P(B) \dots \therefore \forall x P(x)$ # if $AB\dots$ enumerate all
individuals
- Existential instantiation
 - $\exists x P(x) \therefore P(F)$
- Existential generalization
 - $P(A) \therefore \exists x P(x)$

← **Skolem* constant F**
F must be a “new” constant not appearing in the KB

* After Thoralf Skolem

Universal instantiation (a.k.a. universal elimination)

- If $(\forall x) P(x)$ is true, then $P(C)$ is true, where C is *any* constant in the domain of x , e.g.:

$$(\forall x) \text{ eats}(\text{John}, x) \Rightarrow \\ \text{eats}(\text{John}, \text{Cheese18})$$

- Note that function applied to ground terms is also a constant

$$(\forall x) \text{ eats}(\text{John}, x) \Rightarrow \\ \text{eats}(\text{John}, \text{contents}(\text{Box42}))$$

Existential instantiation

(a.k.a. existential elimination)

- From $(\exists x) P(x)$ infer $P(c)$, e.g.:
 - $(\exists x) \text{eats}(\text{Mikey}, x) \rightarrow \text{eats}(\text{Mikey}, \text{Stuff345})$
- The variable is replaced by a **brand-new constant** not occurring in this or any sentence in the KB
- Also known as skolemization; constant is a **skolem constant**
- We don't want to accidentally draw other inferences about it by introducing the constant
- Can use this to reason about unknown objects, rather than constantly manipulating existential quantifiers

Existential generalization (a.k.a. existential introduction)

- If $P(c)$ is true, then $(\exists x) P(x)$ is inferred, e.g.:
Eats(Mickey, Cheese18) \Rightarrow
 $(\exists x)$ eats(Mickey, x)
- All instances of the given constant symbol are replaced by the new variable symbol
- Note that the variable symbol cannot already exist anywhere in the expression

Translating English to FOL

Every gardener likes the sun

$$\forall x \text{ gardener}(x) \rightarrow \text{likes}(x, \text{Sun})$$

You can fool some of the people all of the time

$$\exists x \forall t \text{ person}(x) \wedge \text{time}(t) \rightarrow \text{can-fool}(x, t)$$

You can fool all of the people some of the time

$$\exists t \text{ time}(t) \wedge \forall x \text{ person}(x) \rightarrow \text{can-fool}(x, t)$$

$$\forall x \text{ person}(x) \rightarrow \exists t \text{ time}(t) \wedge \text{can-fool}(x, t)$$

Note 2 possible readings of NL sentence

All purple mushrooms are poisonous

$$\forall x (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \rightarrow \text{poisonous}(x)$$

Translating English to FOL

No purple mushroom is poisonous (two ways)

$\neg \exists x \text{ purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{poisonous}(x)$

$\forall x (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \rightarrow \neg \text{poisonous}(x)$

There are exactly two purple mushrooms

$\exists x \exists y \text{ mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(y) \wedge$
 $\text{purple}(y) \wedge \neg(x=y) \wedge \forall z (\text{mushroom}(z) \wedge \text{purple}(z))$
 $\rightarrow ((x=z) \vee (y=z))$

Obama is not short

$\neg \text{short}(\text{Obama})$

Logic and People



"Logic—the last refuge of a scoundrel."

- People can easily be confused by logic
- And are often suspicious of it, or give it too much weight

Monty Python example (Russell & Norvig)



FIRST VILLAGER: We have found a witch. May we burn her?

ALL: A witch! Burn her!

BEDEVERE: Why do you think she is a witch?

SECOND VILLAGER: She turned *me* into a newt.

B: A newt?

V2 (*after looking at himself for some time*): I got better.

ALL: Burn her anyway.

B: Quiet! Quiet! There are ways of telling whether she is a witch.



B: Tell me... what do you do with witches?

ALL: Burn them!

B: And what do you burn, apart from witches?

V4: ...wood?

B: So **why do witches burn?**

V2 (*pianissimo*): **because they' re made of wood?**

B: Good.

ALL: I see. Yes, of course.

B: So how can we tell if she is made of wood?

V1: Make a bridge out of her.

B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?

ALL: Yes, of course... um... er...

B: Does wood sink in water?

ALL: No, no, it floats. Throw her in the pond.

B: Wait. Wait... tell me, what also floats on water?

ALL: Bread? No, no no. Apples... gravy... very small rocks...

B: No, no, no,





KING ARTHUR: A duck!

(They all turn and look at Arthur. Bedevere looks up, very impressed.)

B: Exactly. So... logically...

V1 *(beginning to pick up the thread):* **If she... weighs the same as a duck... she's made of wood.**

B: And therefore?

ALL: **A witch!**

Fallacy: Affirming the conclusion

$\forall x \text{ witch}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$

$\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$

$\therefore \forall z \text{ witch}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$

$p \rightarrow q$

$r \rightarrow q$

$p \rightarrow r$



Monty Python Near-Fallacy #2

$\text{wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{can-build-bridge}(x)$

$\therefore \text{can-build-bridge}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$

- B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?

Monty Python Fallacy #3

$\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$

$\forall x \text{ duck-weight}(x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$

$\therefore \forall x \text{ duck-weight}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$

$p \rightarrow q$

$r \rightarrow q$

$\therefore r \rightarrow p$

Monty Python Fallacy #4

$\forall z \text{ light}(z) \rightarrow \text{wood}(z)$

$\text{light}(W)$

$\therefore \text{wood}(W)$

% ok.....

$\text{witch}(W) \rightarrow \text{wood}(W)$

% applying universal instan.
% to fallacious conclusion #1

$\text{wood}(W)$

$\therefore \text{witch}(z)$

Example: A simple genealogy KB by FOL

- **Build a small genealogy knowledge base using FOL that**
 - contains facts of immediate family relations (spouses, parents, etc.)
 - contains definitions of more complex relations (ancestors, relatives)
 - is able to answer queries about relationships between people
- **Predicates:**
 - parent(x, y), child(x, y), father(x, y), daughter(x, y), etc.
 - spouse(x, y), husband(x, y), wife(x,y)
 - ancestor(x, y), descendant(x, y)
 - male(x), female(y)
 - relative(x, y)
- **Facts:**
 - husband(Joe, Mary), son(Fred, Joe)
 - spouse(John, Nancy), male(John), son(Mark, Nancy)
 - father(Jack, Nancy), daughter(Linda, Jack)
 - daughter(Liz, Linda)
 - etc.

• Rules for genealogical relations

$(\forall x,y)$ parent(x, y) \leftrightarrow child (y, x)

$(\forall x,y)$ father(x, y) \leftrightarrow parent(x, y) \wedge male(x) ; *similarly for mother(x, y)*

$(\forall x,y)$ daughter(x, y) \leftrightarrow child(x, y) \wedge female(x) ; *similarly for son(x, y)*

$(\forall x,y)$ husband(x, y) \leftrightarrow spouse(x, y) \wedge male(x) ; *similarly for wife(x, y)*

$(\forall x,y)$ spouse(x, y) \leftrightarrow spouse(y, x) ; *spouse relation is symmetric*

$(\forall x,y)$ parent(x, y) \rightarrow ancestor(x, y)

$(\forall x,y)(\exists z)$ parent(x, z) \wedge ancestor(z, y) \rightarrow ancestor(x, y)

$(\forall x,y)$ descendant(x, y) \leftrightarrow ancestor(y, x)

$(\forall x,y)(\exists z)$ ancestor(z, x) \wedge ancestor(z, y) \rightarrow relative(x, y)

;related by common ancestry

$(\forall x,y)$ spouse(x, y) \rightarrow relative(x, y) ;related by marriage

$(\forall x,y)(\exists z)$ relative(z, x) \wedge relative(z, y) \rightarrow relative(x, y) ; *transitive*

$(\forall x,y)$ relative(x, y) \leftrightarrow relative(y, x) ; *symmetric*

• Queries

– ancestor(Jack, Fred) ; *the answer is yes*

– relative(Liz, Joe) ; *the answer is yes*

– relative(Nancy, Matthew) ; *no answer, no under closed world assumption*

– $(\exists z)$ ancestor(z, Fred) \wedge ancestor(z, Liz)

Axioms for Set Theory in FOL

1. The only sets are the empty set and those made by adjoining something to a set:
$$\forall s \text{ set}(s) \iff (s = \text{EmptySet}) \vee (\exists x, r \text{ Set}(r) \wedge s = \text{Adjoin}(s, r))$$
2. The empty set has no elements adjoined to it:
$$\sim \exists x, s \text{ Adjoin}(x, s) = \text{EmptySet}$$
3. Adjoining an element already in the set has no effect:
$$\forall x, s \text{ Member}(x, s) \iff s = \text{Adjoin}(x, s)$$
4. The only members of a set are the elements that were adjoined into it:
$$\forall x, s \text{ Member}(x, s) \iff \exists y, r (s = \text{Adjoin}(y, r) \wedge (x = y \vee \text{Member}(x, r)))$$
5. A set is a subset of another iff all of the 1st set's members are members of the 2nd:
$$\forall s, r \text{ Subset}(s, r) \iff (\forall x \text{ Member}(x, s) \implies \text{Member}(x, r))$$
6. Two sets are equal iff each is a subset of the other:
$$\forall s, r (s = r) \iff (\text{subset}(s, r) \wedge \text{subset}(r, s))$$
7. Intersection
$$\forall x, s1, s2 \text{ member}(X, \text{intersection}(S1, S2)) \iff \text{member}(X, s1) \wedge \text{member}(X, s2)$$
8. Union
$$\exists x, s1, s2 \text{ member}(X, \text{union}(s1, s2)) \iff \text{member}(X, s1) \vee \text{member}(X, s2)$$

Semantics of FOL

- **Domain M:** the set of all objects in the world (of interest)
- **Interpretation I:** includes
 - Assign each constant to an object in M
 - Define each function of n arguments as a mapping $M^n \Rightarrow M$
 - Define each predicate of n arguments as a mapping $M^n \Rightarrow \{T, F\}$
 - Therefore, every ground predicate with any instantiation will have a truth value
 - In general there's an infinite number of interpretations because $|M|$ is infinite
- **Define logical connectives:** $\sim, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow$ as in PL
- **Define semantics of $(\forall x)$ and $(\exists x)$**
 - $(\forall x) P(x)$ is true iff $P(x)$ is true under all interpretations
 - $(\exists x) P(x)$ is true iff $P(x)$ is true under some interpretation

- **Model:** an interpretation of a set of sentences such that every sentence is *True*
- **A sentence is**
 - **satisfiable** if it is true under some interpretation
 - **valid** if it is true under all possible interpretations
 - **inconsistent** if there does not exist any interpretation under which the sentence is true
- **Logical consequence:** $S \models X$ if all models of S are also models of X

Axioms, definitions and theorems

- **Axioms** are facts and rules that attempt to capture all of the (important) facts and concepts about a domain; axioms can be used to prove **theorems**
 - Mathematicians don't want any unnecessary (dependent) axioms, i.e. ones that can be derived from other axioms
 - Dependent axioms can make reasoning faster, however
 - Choosing a good set of axioms for a domain is a design problem
- A **definition** of a predicate is of the form " $p(X) \leftrightarrow \dots$ " and can be decomposed into two parts
 - Necessary** description: " $p(x) \rightarrow \dots$ "
 - Sufficient** description " $p(x) \leftarrow \dots$ "
 - Some concepts don't have complete definitions (e.g., $\text{person}(x)$)

More on definitions

Example: define $\text{father}(x, y)$ by $\text{parent}(x, y)$ and $\text{male}(x)$

- $\text{parent}(x, y)$ is a necessary (but not sufficient) description of $\text{father}(x, y)$

$$\text{father}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{parent}(x, y)$$

- $\text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x) \wedge \text{age}(x, 35)$ is a sufficient (but not necessary) description of $\text{father}(x, y)$:


$$\text{father}(x, y) \leftarrow \text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x) \wedge \text{age}(x, 35)$$

- $\text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x)$ is a necessary and sufficient description of $\text{father}(x, y)$

$$\text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{father}(x, y)$$


More on definitions

S(x) is a
necessary
condition of P(x)




$$(\forall x) P(x) \Rightarrow S(x)$$

S(x) is a
sufficient
condition of P(x)



$$(\forall x) P(x) \Leftarrow S(x)$$

S(x) is a
necessary and
sufficient
condition of P(x)



$$(\forall x) P(x) \Leftrightarrow S(x)$$

Higher-order logic

- FOL only allows to quantify over variables, and variables can only range over objects.
- HOL allows us to quantify over relations
- Example: (quantify over functions)
“two functions are equal iff they produce the same value for all arguments”
$$\forall f \forall g (f = g) \leftrightarrow (\forall x f(x) = g(x))$$
- Example: (quantify over predicates)
$$\forall r \text{transitive}(r) \rightarrow (\forall xyz) r(x,y) \wedge r(y,z) \rightarrow r(x,z)$$
- More expressive, but undecidable, in general

Expressing uniqueness



syntactic
sugar

- We often want to say that there is a single, unique object that satisfies a certain condition
- There exists a unique x such that $\text{king}(x)$ is true
 - $\exists x \text{ king}(x) \wedge \forall y (\text{king}(y) \rightarrow x=y)$
 - $\exists x \text{ king}(x) \wedge \neg \exists y (\text{king}(y) \wedge x \neq y)$
 - $\exists! x \text{ king}(x)$
- “Every country has exactly one ruler”
 - $\forall c \text{ country}(c) \rightarrow \exists! r \text{ ruler}(c,r)$
- Iota operator: $\iota x P(x)$ means “the unique x such that $p(x)$ is true”
 - “The unique ruler of Freedonia is dead”
 - $\text{dead}(\iota x \text{ ruler}(\text{freedonia},x))$

Notational differences

- **Different symbols** for *and*, *or*, *not*, *implies*, ...

– $\forall \exists \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow \wedge \vee \neg \bullet \supset$

– $p \vee (q \wedge r)$

– $p + (q * r)$

- **Prolog**

$\text{cat}(X) \text{ :- } \text{furry}(X), \text{meows}(X), \text{has}(X, \text{claws})$

- **Lispy notations**

(forall ?x (implies (and (furry ?x)

(meows ?x)

(has ?x claws))

(cat ?x)))

FOL Summary

- First order logic (FOL) introduces predicates, functions and quantifiers
- More expressive, but reasoning is more complex
 - Reasoning in propositional logic is NP hard, FOL is semi-decidable
- A common AI knowledge representation language
 - Other KR languages (e.g., [OWL](#)) are often defined by mapping them to FOL
- FOL variables range over objects
 - HOL variables can range over functions, predicates or sentences